HomeMy WebLinkAboutAgenda Report - May 19, 1982 (66)�, CIt COtiNCILFit
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BETTY SEMAS VS Following introduction of agenda item "j" - "Betty Semas v.
CITY OF LODI City of Lodi action concerninq the Almond Drive Estates---"
Robert Sternfels, Attorney-at-law representing Mrs. Semas address-
ed the Council regarding a possible compromise of the subject
dispute.
Following a lengthy discussion, with questions being directed
to Mr. Sternfels and to the City Attorney, Council, on motion
of Mayor Reid, Pinkerton second, voted to take no action on
this matter.
ROOERT B. STERNIELs. ESO.
LAURA E. BAINORIoac. ESO.
ELLEN A. BAINORIOOc, Eso.
(Of COUNSEL)
BAINBRIDGE 6 STERNFELS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
A peOrCSSIONAL CORPORATION
May 5, 1982
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RECEIVED
' ZI"L#t7OaASQia Bul*a •
LOOI, CALI►OIiN 2
Aa•- 3n7
940-2331CiiY
OFT -37-P7033 L 076 R01
Lodi City Council
City Nall
221 West Pine Street
Lodi, CA 95240
Attention: Alice M. Reimche
Re: Betty Semas v. City of Lodi (Almond Drive Estates)
Dear Ms. Reimche:
Please schedule the Betty Semas v. City of Lodi action
concerning the Almond Drive Estates as an agenda matter for
the upcoming City Council meeting.
We would like the City Council to consider a possible
compromise of the dispute.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
aura E. Bainbridge
BAINBRIDGE & STERNFELS
LEB
cc: Betty Semas
10451
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RECEIVED
190 MAY 18 PN I= 34
P�YN. REIM6t�
�ru�
NAOMI LHIDNOIN
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN
BETTY SEKAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF LODI, of al.,
Defendants.
No. 158705
RULING 014 DEFENDANT CITY OF
LOWS DEMURRER TO SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff owns and operates a mobile home park in the
City of Lodi, which is located 200 feet west of Cherokee Lane and
fronts on Almond Drive. Almond Drive runs in an east -west direc-
tion and connects with Cherokee Lane.
Ever since 1961, when plaintiff's predecessor in intere:
first acquired a permit to operate a trailer park at that loca-
tion, access to Almond Drive has been by a 70 -foot wide macadam
driveway.
In 1981, the City of Lodi commenced installing concrete
curbs, gutters and sidewalks along Almond Drive, and indicated to
plaintiff the intention of reducing her driveway from 70 feet to
30 feet. The second amended complaint alleges that plaintiff
presented a request to the Lodi City Council that she be allowed
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to retain her 70 -foot driveway, but that the request was refused
after a hearing and she was granted a 35 -foot driveway instead,
giving the Lodi Department of Public Works the authority to in-
crease the size of the driveway if it decided in its discretion
that a hardship existed.
The second amended complaint, alleges further that it
was the opinion of the City Engineer and the Department of Public
Works that no hardship existed, so that plaintiff's request to
retain her 70 -foot driveway was refused, and a 35 -foot concrete
driveway has now been completed.
By her previous first ascended complaint, plaintiff had
suught equitable relief from this Court requiring the City of
Lodi to widen the driveway to the former width of 70 feet. How-
ever, rafter demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained
with leave to amend, plaintiff, by her second amended complaint,
has abandoned attempts to obtain injunctive relief, and now seeks
damages alone on the alternative theories of irrevocable license,
interference with access rights, and estoppel.
The City of Lodi has demurred generally to the second
ar..ended cor..plaint, and has presented arguments again_;t the irre-
vocable license and estoppel theories of recovery, but no argu-
ment as to the interference with access cause of action contained
in the second cause of action.
The demurrer to the first and third causes of action
is hereby sustained without leave to amend, for the following
reason::.
Estoppel cannot
be
a.sertcd aqainst a
municipal
corpora-
orpora-tion
tionor other public ent i
c y
to property hold
for public
use.
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(City of San Diego v. Cuya►nac.z-Water Co. , 209 Cal. 105; 10 Mc-
Quillin on Municipal Corporations ;3d ed., revised) section 28.56;
56 Am.Jur.2d 608.) This is particularly true as to driveway
access rights in public street.. (Alexander Co. v. City of
Owatonna (Minn.) 24 N.W. 2d 244; see, Frederick v. City of
Louisville (Ky.) 242 S.W. 2d 267.)
Plaintiff has cited no case holding that an abutting
owner can obtain an irrevocable license to driveway access to a
public street of any particuiar width si:iply because installation
of a driveway of that width in the past constituted expenditure
of funds for an improvement within the irrevocable license doctri
No cases have been found applying the irrevocable
license theory as against public entities. The principal cases
in California invoking irrevocable licenses (Cooke v. Ramponi,
38 Cal.2d 282; Stoner v. Zucker, 148 Cal. 516; Hammond v. Mustard,
257 Cal.App.2d 484), deal with privately -owned real property.
The doctrine of irrevocable license is predicated on
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Belmont County Water
District v. State of California, 65 Cal.App.3d 13.) It there-
fore goes without saying, that, if estoppel cannot be asserted
against a municipal corporation, as to property held for public
use, neither can irrevocable license.
In an analogous situation, the rule is firmly establishe
(that a person cannot obtain an irrevocable license as against a
government body by connectinc.- to a sewer service and expending
money for improvements in reliance on such a parol license.
(Elliott v. City_ of Pacific Grove, 54 Cal.App.3d 53; 10 McQuillin
on Municipal Corporations, supra, section 31.31.)
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Unquestionably, the Lodi City Council, as the governing
body having control of the streets in Lodi, had the authority _n
the exercise of its police power to deny plaintiff's application
for continuance of a 70 -foot driveway opening on Almond Drive.
(Delta Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. City of Beverly Hills, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 781; Stevenson v. City of Downey, 205 Cal.App.2d 585;
Flemming v. Maturin (La.) 14 So. 2d 356; Elder v. Mayor of City
of Newport (R.I.) 57 A. 2d 653; 10 'lcQuillen on Municipal Corpor-
ations, supra, section 30.64.)
This, however, does not mean that the Lodi City Council.
or the Lodi Department of Public Works had the right to substan-
tially or unreasonably impair plaintiff's access to Almond Drive
for her mobile home park without making just compensation therefor
Plaintiff would certainly have the right to bring suit
against the City of Lodi in inverse condemnation for damages
caused by "substantial impairment" of her right of access as an
abutting property owner. (Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co., 61
Cal.2d 653; County of mtonterey v. W. ►1. Learing Unlimited, 109 Cal
App.3d 636; Vactner v. State of California ex rel., Department of
Public Vorks, 51 Cal.App.3cl 472; United California Hank. v. People
ex rel. Devartment of Public t_orks, 1 Cal.App.3d 1.)
The second cause of action of the second amended cora-
p.aint at least attempts to assert a theory of interference with
access to the mobile home park. However, as it now reads, it
fails to state a proper cause of action in inverse condemnation
for recovery of damages for "substantial impairment" of access
by an abutting property owner.
The demurrer to the second cause of action is hereby
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sustained with 20 days; leave to amend.
Attorneys fees would not be recoverable as presently
pleaded, in the absence of a showing of contractual or statutory
authorization. however, they would he recoverable in inverse
condemnation. (Code of Civil Procedure section 1036.)
The motion to st:-.O! a paragraphs 14 and 15 of the second
amended complaint is hereby granted since the allegations con-
tained therein as to the temporary restraining order which was
dissolved are totally immaterial to any of plaintiff's theories
of recovery, even the theory of inverse condemnation.
Although the Court can take judicial notice of the re-
cords of the Lodi and San Joaquin County Planning Commissions,
the Lodi City Council, and the Lodi Depar•.ment of Public Works,
which are attached to the City of Lodi's points and authorities
in support of its demurrer (Evidence Code section 452(b); O'Keeft
v. Atascadero County Sanitation District, 21 Cal.App.3d 719;.
Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal.App.2d 32; Agostini v.
Strycula, 231 Ca1.App.2d 804), there is nothing in those docu-
ments that is of any real importance to this ruling.
Dated: May
•
FRANX KIIi
Superior Court Judge
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